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PARENTS AND CHILDREN-RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES AND NEEDS: AN ENGLISH
PERSPECTIVE
JOHN EEKELAAR*

At a time when it is being increasingly claimed that animals
have, or should be seen as having, rights, it would be difficult to
refuse to attribute rights to children. Almost everyone today
would admit that children have "rights." But when we try to
discover what these rights are and, more significantly, what the
implications of recognising these rights hold for the adult world,
consensus fails and commitment to children's rights falters. In
this paper I will argue that, far from being firmly established,
the concept of children's rights is under serious threat. We need
to confront more openly what kind of claim we are making when
we assert that children have rights. We need to appreciate that
the ascription of rights to children, just as assuredly as their
ascription to any other group, whether human (such as slaves) or
animal, carries with it the logical corollary of limiting and supervising the freedom of other members of the community.
What kind of rights do children have? In essence, the answer we give to this question reveals our assumptions about
what we consider to be the good life. It is, in short, a political
question. I do not intend to dwell on the kinds of aspirations
that people have held, and still hold, for their communities and
their children. They are far too diffuse. Instead I will put forward a principle which in a rough and imperfect manner represents the seminal idea behind many, or most, of the claims presently made in our society about what children should be entitled
to. The principle is that, given the social and economic structure of our present society, all children should have an equal
opportunity to maximise the resources available to them during
their childhood (including their own inherent abilities) so as to
minimise the extent to which they enter adult life affected by
* Fellow of Pembroke College, and Lecturer in Jurisprudence, Oxford University.
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avoidable prejudices incurred during childhood. The Committee
on Child Health Services (1976) expressed this principle when it
observed that "the 1970's may come to be seen as the decade in
which the industrialised world tried to provide for all children
the same range and quality of services as they had already created for some children."1 This is a broad principle, significantly
qualified by the reference to the current socio-economic conditions. It is by no means completely, or even nearly, translated
into achievement. But it does explain, I think, the root of concern for the quality of the lives of children, whether handicapped or not, whether within their own families or outside,
whether subjected to family breakdown or not. In short, we are
concerned lest some children are "disadvantaged."
This principle, like others that people may hold about children's claims, rests on the political level. Much of its implementation, therefore, must be at that level. The cost to the community appears in expenditures in such areas as children's medical
services and education. These claims cannot be said, in Britain
at least, to have been translated into legal rights. What, then, is
the mechanism for translating such claims into legal form? Normally, it is done by conferring legally enforceable claims on the
children's parents. A mother's entitlement to child benefits, or
other social provisions geared to the family, for example, rests
on the conceptualisation of the parent as agent of the child. The
child does not have the competence to make the claim. The parent is expected to do so on his behalf and to use the provision
for his benefit. We have here the basis for a very important idea.
The parent is given a legal right against the state to an entitlement premised on the child's needs. The parent, therefore, is expected to use the right for the child's benefit. The parent is socially, if not legally, a trustee for the child.
But parents are expected to do more than make use of family-based entitlements, provided by the state, for the benefit of
their children. The social organisation of our society entrusts to
parents the primary task of caring for their children during
childhood. How can this be reconciled with the basic principle of
children's rights mentioned earlier? To permit unrestricted parental autonomy would be to abandon the principle to the
1.
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whims of parents. I think there is little doubt how, socially, we
resolve the conflict. Parents are expected to do their best for
their children; to love them, to promote their interests, to treat
them equally. Failure to do this invites social criticism. The
problem is how this social expectation is to be given legal form.
If it is not, children will have no rights whatsoever.
At this point we confront the major challenge to children's
rights. For there is only one way in which their basic rights can
be secured, and this is by making their parents accountable for
the exercise of their parental role. Legally, the position can be
explained by analogy with the trust. The parents have the legal
right to care for their children which is exercisable against outsiders in the same way as trustees have the legal right to deal
with trust property. But, like trustees, they must exercise these
rights in the interests of the beneficiaries. Their rights against
third parties are in effect duties towards the beneficiaries. But
socially the result is that parents are not truly autonomous at
all. At most, they exercise their parental rights on a kind of implied license from the community. Their judgement may be
2
questioned. In the last resort, their trust may be terminated.
It is the contention of this paper that, unless we are prepared to accept the full implications of this position, we are not
realistically committed to giving children rights. It is here where
these rights are most vulnerable to attack, for clearly their expression opposes strongly held political beliefs. One of these beliefs is the value of family autonomy. The other, its counterpart,
is of the political undesirability, both from an ideological and an
economic standpoint, of interventionist government. This line of
attack can perhaps loosely be described as the neo-conservative
objection.3 Opposition also comes from another quarter. Community judgement about how parents care for their children can
be represented as the imposition, through agency imperialism, of
middle class standards on other social groups distinguished by
their class or ethnic character,4 or, in its feminist version, on a
Beck, Glavis, Glover, Jenkins & Nardi, The Rights of Children:A Trust Model, 46
L. REV. 669 (1978).
3. Dickens, The Modern Function and Limits of Parental Rights, 97 L.Q. REV. 462,
465 (1981).
4. A. MORRIS, H. GILLER, E. SZWED & H. GEACH, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN (1980); L.
TAYLOR, R. LACEY & L. BRACKEN, IN WHOSE BEST INTERESTS? (1980).
2.
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woman's freedom. This might loosely be described as the leftradical objection, although, significantly in this age of growing
political polarisation, similar arguments are to be found in the
radical right. The forces yield a powerful combination. We might
legitimately wonder whether children's rights can survive.
Let us examine the two positions more closely. Perhaps the
strongest expression of the former is to be found in Before the
Best Interests of the Child, by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit,
published in the United States in 1979 and in Britain in 1980.1
In this work, the authors propose the policy of minimum state
intervention in family life. Interference in parental care of children is to be confined to the most extreme cases of physical
harm. Damage to a child's emotional well-being would never justify such intervention.' This, of course, is a legitimate viewpoint
to take. But instead of presenting this as a diminution of children's rights, justified as the proper price to pay for the furtherance of a political ideology, it is presented as a fuller enhancement of children's rights. This is done by constructing the
concept of "family integrity," which is a combination of "the
three liberty interests of direct concern to children, parental autonomy, the right to autonomous parents and privacy."' 7 Thus, it
is the child's right that the parents develop uninterrupted psychological ties with him, free from state intrusion.
It is this identification of children's rights with parental autonomy which makes this doctrine so dangerous to children's
rights. On close examination, it will be seen that this is not a
theory about children's rights at all. To make a case for the existence of rights is to argue for a principle. But this proposition is
not one of principle. It is partly a theory about how society
should be organised and partly an expression of opinion about
matters that are contingent to possible rights, not about the
rights themselves. To count as a theory of children's rights, it
would have to be expressive of some claims that can plausibly be
attributable to children's interests. Consider, for example, the
claim to a safe upbringing or to equality with other children. A
"right" to be brought up by one's biological parents falls outside
5. J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
(1979).
6. Id. at 75.
7. Id. at 9.
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any such reasonable claim because such an upbringing, unless
heavily qualified, is consistent with a complete negation of any
claims a child might reasonably have. Thus, the preference for
parental upbringing is better seen as an ideal of social organisation, capable of operating consistently with children's claims and
even enhancing them, but not necessarily synonymous with
them.
The point can be made more strongly with regard to the
proposition that it is a child's right that the parent-child relationship should be uninterrupted.Such continuity cannot in itself reasonably constitute a child's right, for, as the authors concede, it may in some cases do the child great harm.8 It is
therefore merely a contingent judgement that such an uninterrupted relationship is normally the best instrument for advancing the child's true rights. What these rights may be is not
clearly articulated, but they are probably related to the authors'
view that without uninterrupted parental care, children are unable to cope emotionally with adult life.' Whether we agree with
this contingent judgement thus becomes not a question of principle but of evidential evaluation both in general and in any particular case. This in turn depends on our degree of acceptance of
various aspects of psychoanalytic theory and also of a political
view hostile to enhanced state intervention. The authors claim
that the "legal system" lacks resources adequately to respond
appropriately to a child's needs.1" But whether we make such
resources available or not is a political matter. The exclusion of
emotional harm as a ground for intervention is based on the
claim that the ground is "too imprecise" to give parents fair
warning of intervention or to adequately control the actions of
state officials. These are obviously issues separate from any
claim the children might have. The exclusion is further justified
on the ground that knowledge of the causes of such harm and its
proper treatment is insufficient to justify such intervention."
This is a remarkable argument for these authors to advance, for
the very cornerstone of their case for uninterrupted parental upbringing and minimal state intervention is alleged to be its cen8. Id. at 12-13.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id. at 75.
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trality to the proper emotional development of the child.12 If the
whole concept is as imprecise and uncertain as this, it seems a
very weak basis for a theory of intervention or non-intervention.
On the other hand, if proper emotional development is so important, it is hard to see why it alone, if denied a child, should be
excluded as a ground for intervention.
We should now consider the second source of threat to children's rights mentioned earlier. The argument here is perhaps
more overtly political, for the charge of agency imperialism
clearly identifies a conflict between social groups: which group is
to win the hearts and minds of the community's children? Like
much political invective, this attack depends for its potency on
generalisations from particular cases so as to conjure up folk demons. A recurring figure in this demonology is the "predatory
social worker" or "authoritarian" health visitor. The following
example is taken from Ferdinand Mount's recent book, The
Subversive Family, written from a rightist perspective and of
special significance owing to the influence the writer apparently
holds over the present British Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher. He is describing the British health visitor: "This
kindly, middle-aged body has at her ultimate disposal a Stalinist
array of powers . . .the Visitor-grim, symbolic title-remains
an Intruder."1 3
If such incipient, or actual, totalitarianism really is the political price we must pay for children's rights, perhaps we should
abandon them. But it is not. It is easy to refute Mount. The
statement is just false. The health visitor has in fact no powers,
Stalinist or otherwise, at her disposal. She has no rights of entry
into any home. At most, she may refer a case to social services, a
matter involving complex negotiation between the services. And
indeed, the whole left-radical case is vulnerable by simple appeal
to the facts. Its weakness might be detected by the fact that, for
every alleged case of apparently over-zealous intervention, there
can be found individual cases, usually attracting equal publicity,
of apparently culpable failure to intervene. But individual cases
or anecdotal evidence must be rejected as a means of discovering
12. Id. at 9-10.
13.

F. MOUNT, THE SUBVERSIVE FAMILY 174 (1982). Mount is a senior policy adviser to

the British government.
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the way the child care services really operate. The "notorious
case" tends to set up a mythology of its own, just as in social
services the "memory" of a lost case frequently generates a
widespread and enduring perception of the courts as being hostile to social services cases even when the reality is quite otherwise. The argument that the "authoritarian" social worker or
health visitor is a myth is based on the findings of extensive research into the actual operation of the health and social services
as regards the identification and response to child abuse and
neglect."' As far as health visiting is concerned, the research
shows that such extensive surveillance of children under five is
possible in Britain precisely because there are no coercive powers. Voluntariness, persuasion and example are the key
15
instruments.
But quite beyond that, the research also shows that the
agencies operate within a systematic set of beliefs which all
function as inhibitors on state intervention. The most important
of these is the "rule of optimism" whereunder, unless abuse or
neglect is overt (which is rare), parental explanations for the
causes of events or conditions of children are treated as true unless there are substantial grounds for discounting them. Parents
are held naturally to love their children and, unless this can be
shown to be absent, which workers are extremely reluctant to
find, the presence of such love will override or excuse most allegations.1 6 Similarly, workers hold to an ideal of parental responsibility. Attempts to act responsibly in one's children's interests,
even if unsuccessful, or in accordance with different values, will
be a potent parental excuse. As a broad indictment of agency
behaviour, charges of class or cultural imperialism will not stand
up. Nor will charges of bureaucratic imperialism. Before coercive
intervention can be successfully achieved, a case is characteristically processed through a series of organisational elements. Usually personnel from the health services, social services, the legal
department and, finally, the court, must be in agreement on the
proposed action. Indeed, lack of proper liaison among the vari14.
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ous agencies is frequently cited as a cause for failure to intervene. Looked at another way, the multi-agency system could be
seen as a system of checks and balances, a further inhibition
against over-zealous intervention.
It is not my purpose to suggest that present child welfare
law, administration and practice is flawless, or that inappropriate intervention does not or cannot happen. It is good that individuals and organisations should draw attention to threats of
overbearing bureaucracy and infractions of adult liberties. What
I do maintain, however, is that the true recognition of children's
rights demands a compromise with these other values. To imagine that the undiminished maintenance of adult liberties, or
family autonomy free from community surveillance, is consistent
with children's rights, let alone synonymous with them, is an illusion and, from the point of view of children, a dangerous one. I
would further maintain that, by and large, the framework and
administration 'of child welfare law in England embodies the
necessary compromise between these adult values and the claims
of children. The line drawn in this compromise is inevitably unstable. But the adult values are, as it were, built into the system.
In my judgement the balance presently' struck between these
values and the responsibility of these agencies to protect children's rights is on the whole acceptable, although this is sometimes achieved despite the statutory framework rather than because of it. The same cannot be said about the apparent
expansion of the High Court wardship jurisdiction into this
area 17 for there the checks and balances of child welfare law are
lacking. However, it is to be hoped that recent remarks in the
Court of Appeal will have arrested this tendency. 8
We turn now from child welfare law to the arena of divorce.
Here, I believe, there is probably more consensus about what
children's rights are, or should be. However, there is less willingness on the part of adults to carry this rhetoric into practice.
This was vividly illustrated recently in the discussion in the columns of The Times following the Court of Appeal decision in
Richards v. Richards.9 In that case, the wife, after having
17. See, e.g., Re CB (a minor) [1981] 1 All E.R. 16.
18. THE TIMES (London), Jan. 25, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
19. THE TIMES (London), Dec. 9, 1982.
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served the husband with a divorce petition, left the house, a
Council home, with the two children, a girl of 5 1/2and a boy of
3 1/2. She was living temporarily with a woman friend, intending,
it seems, to move in with another man. But that plan collapsed,
she had to leave her present address and was offered only a caravan by the Council. She refused to return to the home while the
husband remained there and sought his eviction. The court,
faced with a man living alone in a family-sized Council house
and a mother and two young children in, or about to go into, a'
caravan, acceded to her request, even though it accepted that
the wife had no "reasonable ground" for refusing to return to
her husband. "The needs of the children were paramount" said
Cumming-Bruce L.J., "and the father [had] to accept . . . that
his personal interests must be subordinated [to those of] the
children."2 0 That the interests of the children, who on any view
are the innocent and most vulnerable participants, should be
paramount in the resolution of divorce disputes is an oft-repeated sentiment. But here they clashed with the apparently
justified claims of an adult, the father. In commenting on this
case in an editorial, The Times paid the ritual lip-service to the
children's interests: "In approaching these cases the courts have
quite rightly taken the view that the interests of the children
must have priority." But, having considered that in Richards
these interests clashed with the apparently justified claims of an
adult, the father, the editorial concluded:
• . .there is the question whether the courts should not
restrain their understandable inclination to further above
all else the interests of the children (and thus of their
mother) in situations of family breakdown. Should the
children's needs be allowed to override all other considerations? . . . . The requirements of justice to the family
as a whole may not always coincide with what appear to
be the children's immediate needs.21
The House of Lords later overruled the reasoning of the
Court of Appeal and held that, although relevant, the children's
interests were not to be given priority. 22 The decision can be
20.
21.
22.

Richards v. Richards [1983] 1 All E.R. 1017, 1023.
THE TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 1983.
Richards v. Richards [1983] 2 All E.R. 807.
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seen as part of a wider challenge to the interests of children on
divorce. A well-organised campaign to restrict the maintenance
obligations of former husbands towards their former spouses resulted in the introduction on 1 December 1982 of a Private
Member's Bill in the House of Commons,23 and was expected to
lead to Government-sponsored legislation during the 1983-84
Parliamentary session. I am not here concerned about the details of any such reform, but with the general tenor of the debate. This is well represented by a letter from a solicitor published in the journal Family Law in response to an article by
Carol Smart 24 which raised mild questions concerning the thrust
of the proposed reforms. The writer concluded as follows:
In justice there are only two types of divorce law that one
can have. One can have divorce based upon substantial
misconduct with maintenance, or divorce virtually at will
and no maintenance. One cannot in justice or equity have
a situation where women are free to break up their marriages on trivial grounds and then claim financial relief.25
This sentiment captures much of the emotional force of the
anti-maintenance movement. What is notable about it, for present purposes, is that the issue is presented solely as one between adults. It is true that persons making such an argument
might add, parenthetically, that "of course" a man should support his children. But the relegation of child support in this way,
and the shift of attention solely to so-called spousal maintenance, totally misses the true nature and function of post-divorce maintenance. The reality is that maintenance is very seldom claimed by wives on the breakdown of marriages where
there have been no children. For example, the Scottish Law
Commission found such claims in only 16% of such cases.26 Research in progress at the SSRC Centre for Socio-Legal Studies
in Oxford confirms this and in addition found no case in a nationally representative sample of people divorced since 1971,
23.
28).
24.
25.
26.
VISION

Matrimonial Proceedings Bill, presented by Martin Stevens, Dec. 1, 1982 (Bill
Smart, Justice and Divorce: The Way Forward, 12 FAMILY LAW 135 (1982).
Letter from Adrian J.G. Perelman in 13 FAMILY LAW 60 (1983).
SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, FAMILY LAW: REPORT ON ALIMENT AND FINANCIAL PRO72-74 (1981).
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where, ten years later, maintenance in any form was passing between the spouses to such marriages.2 7 In other words, long-term
post-divorce financial support is almost entirely confined to
cases where the recipient former spouse was left with dependent
children of the marriage. Although technically divisible into orders "for the wife" and "for the children," this maintenance is in
effect child support. We return to our characterisation of the
adult claimant to state benefits: the claim is effectively a claim
made on behalf of the children. If we now regard such support
as "family support," which we should, the debate takes on a different aspect. Under this approach, the concluding remarks of
the letter quoted above would then have to read: "One cannot in
justice or equity have a situation where women are free to break
up their marriages on trivial grounds and then claim financial
support for their children." If that is the position, what has happened to the children's rights?
Let us look more closely at the economic position after divorce. If we assume, as we should, that children usually stay
with the mother,2 8 the evidence is overwhelming that that family, which I will call the mother-child family, rapidly descends
into poverty when not supplemented by another adult wageearner. The research reported above found that 54% of the sample who were still single parents in 1981 relied on supplementary
benefit as their main source of income, whereas none of them
had done so at time of marriage and only 15% did at time of
separation. In contrast, only 13 % of those who had now reconstituted were presently on supplementary benefit. 9 In the
United States, data from a longitudinal study of 5,000 families
showed that people who remained married over the period 196773 achieved a 21.7% increase in real family income over that
period, whereas women who divorced or separated in that time
suffered a 29.3% reduction. This type of data can be put in
many different ways, but the results are always the same. Its
27. See generally Eekelaar & Maclean, Financial Provision on Divorce: A Re-appraisal, in STATE LAW AND THE FAMILY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (M.D.A. Freeman ed.
1984).
28. In about 10% of cases, children will stay with the father after divorce. EEKELAAR
& CLIVE, CUSTODY AFTER DIVORCE (1977).
29. See generally J. EEKELAAR & M. MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE (1985).
30. Hoffman, Marital Instability and the Economic Status of Women, 14 DEMOGRAPHY

67 (1977).
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significance is enhanced when it is considered that, if the
mother-child family is to retain its former living standard, it
would require 80 to 90% of the former family's income to do
SO.31 In other words, the needs of that family are far greater than
that of the single former husband. Yet study after study has
shown the paucity of maintenance payments both ordered and
made. As one example, the SSRC research showed that for half
the single-parent families, the amount of maintenance paid over
represented a sum equal to from 11 to 30% of their total household income, and for a quarter of them over 30%. However, the
payments-out exceeded 10% of the household income of only
one-third of the payers.32
How is one to understand children's rights in all this? We
must revert to the initial formulation that, given the social and
economic structure of our present society, all children should
have an equal opportunity to maximise the resources available
to them during their childhood, including their own inherent
abilities, so as to minimise the extent to which they enter adult
life affected by avoidable prejudices incurred during childhood.
Although the evidence is somewhat tentative, it seems plausible
to suppose that the effects of economic adversity of living in a
single-parent family, particularly if prolonged, can cause such
prejudice. Such children are substantially less well off than those
in the "average" family. Alleviation of their position by state
benefits designed to bring them up to or approaching the level of
the "average" family would be one solution, but not consistent
with our society's economic structure. Might they have alternative resources available to them? The obvious one is the earnings of their former breadwinner. One can see the claim to child
support as the expression of a child's right to treatment by the
person delegated the trustee of his rights in such a way as to
minimise the economic adversities of marriage breakdown.
This claim is, however, made more complex by the possible
introduction of a new class of child claimants on the breadwinner. The SSRC research indicated that, while fathers who have
not formed households containing new dependent children
might have significant resources which could be transferred to
31.
32.

See supra note 29.
See supra note 27.
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their former family without bringing them below the standard of
living of the average family, this is not true for men who are now
supporting other children. Such families are much more likely to
live above the national average standard than single-parent families, but will on the whole be less well off than the average family. Fathers in this position could not transfer much more to
their former family without bringing their present family below
the average standard of living. But this situation requires us to
confront the issue of equity between these families. One of the
claims which any reasonable theory of children's rights should
hold must surely be that no child should be subjected to unreasonable discrimination as against other children. Applied in this
context, we can ask whether this claim means that the children
of a man's former family should in principle have an equal claim
to his resources with children of his new family. If the children
were in the same family unit, it would normally be regarded as
unfair if one child was persistently treated less well than others.
However, the countervailing values of privacy and family autonomy preclude intervention in most such cases, though not all, for
an extreme case of the "Cinderella syndrome" might well justify
intervention. But on divorce the family is prised open. No competing claims of privacy or family autonomy oppose the claims
of the children to equal treatment.
The only realistic way of comparing the position of the children is to compare the total household circumstances, especially
income, of the two families. If this means including in the calculation any contributions made by the father's new wife, then this
must be done. For it is precisely in the availability of two income earners that the children of the reconstituted family are
advantaged over those in the former, single-parent family.
If we really believe that children have rights, these issues
must be confronted. They may be uncomfortable ones for adults
to face. But children's rights would not be worth calling rights if
adults did not confront them.

